The “poster child” of refugee policy: What factors explain Uganda’s integrative, long-term refugee policies? by Davy, Jessica
 The “Poster Child” of Refugee Policy 
What factors explain Uganda’s integrative, long-term refugee 
policies? 
 
  
11th June 2018 
Jessica Davy s2024616 
MSc Political Science Thesis 
Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Development 
Supervisor: Dr. M. Longo 
Second Reader: Dr. M. Spirova 
Words: 10,147 
 
1 
 
 
Contents 
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 2 
Literature Review .............................................................................................. 4 
Theoretical expectations ................................................................................. 9 
Research Design .............................................................................................. 10 
The Uganda Case .......................................................................................... 10 
Methodology ................................................................................................ 12 
Investigation of the Ugandan case .................................................................... 14 
History and social receptiveness ................................................................... 14 
Political context ............................................................................................ 17 
Economic capacity ........................................................................................ 19 
National security threats ............................................................................... 21 
Discussion ....................................................................................................... 22 
Findings ........................................................................................................ 22 
A Fifth Explanation ...................................................................................... 27 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 29 
References ....................................................................................................... 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
What factors explain Uganda’s decision to adopt integrative, long-
term refugee policies? 
Introduction 
As of 2017, the developing world currently hosts 84% of the 22.5 million people forced to seek 
refuge from violent conflict, political instability and persecution (Edmond, 2017). This statistic 
reflects two key interpretations: first, the majority of refugee-inducing conflicts are taking place 
in the developing regions of the world. Second, that the international community appears to be 
demonstrating a weakened resolve towards global refugee protection and management (Crisp, 
2003). Most states, particularly in the West, have imposed strict quotas and reinforced their 
borders, despite many having sufficient capacities, infrastructures and available funds 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen & Tan, 2017). Refugee response is equally a problem in Africa, a 
continent experiencing unprecedented conflict, instability and migration, where refugee 
policies remain basic and dysfunctional (Zamfir, 2017). With so much violence, there are few 
countries in Africa who are considered ‘destinations’ which are stable enough. African states 
that do accept refugees, have shown a preference for restricting their freedoms through 
containment in camps, as in Kenya (Amnesty, 2012). 
There is a considerable difference in national refugee policies from one country to 
another, and this extreme disparity in burden sharing exposes the lack of international 
consensus on how to deal with rising numbers of refugees (Thielemann, 2006). In recent years, 
the approach of most host countries has focused on short-term emergency relief, thereby 
creating dependencies that have contributed to unfavourable perceptions, and extortionate costs 
of hosting refugees (Betts et al, 2014). This has fuelled growing intolerances of refugees in 
general, supporting numerous arguments against accepting a ‘fair share’ of the world’s refugee 
population, much less integrating them into domestic society (Ignatieff et al, 2016). Arguments 
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claiming the economic, political and security risks associated with accepting large influxes of 
people continue to justify restrictive policies. 
Out of this bleak appraisal emerges the surprising case of Uganda as the cornerstone of 
progressive and inclusive refugee policy and attitude. For decades, the developing nation has 
provided refuge to its neighbours through policies of integration and long-term sustainability. 
Since August 2016, events in South Sudan have brought Uganda into the spotlight for its 
response to “Africa’s biggest human exodus since the Rwandan genocide” (Pilling, 2017). In 
2016 alone, more people entered Uganda than crossed the Mediterranean Sea (NRC, 2017). 
Aside from simply accepting refugees without question on such a numerous scale, Uganda’s 
pragmatic strategy offers a unique integrative model with promising outcomes for long-term 
self-reliance of refugees. Such policies have earned Uganda international acclaim, affording it 
the bemusing title of “The best place to be a refugee” (BBC, 2017). It certainly offers a lesson 
to other regions in better positions to provide refugee assistance, but do not, that it is possible 
and even beneficial to accept large influxes of people. This dichotomy prompts us to ask, What 
factors explain Uganda’s decision to adopt integrative, long-term refugee policies? 
This research paper will investigate the underlying realities that have driven Uganda’s 
refugee policies. The academic debate identifies the threats to government authority and 
national security, in addition to the pressures on economic resources and host communities as 
providing the most salient barriers to forming largescale and integrative refugee policies. In the 
case of Uganda, we see that these main arguments against liberal policies are in fact the driving 
forces behind them. The following section details an appraisal of the current theoretical debate 
on concerns of states surrounding refugee management policy, which will provide the most 
salient influential factors that will serve to guide the analysis in the qualitative case study of 
Uganda. The research undertaken to answer this question will use process-tracing to identify 
the (historical and contextual) causal dynamics inherent to Uganda, that have led to the 
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adoption of progressive refugee policies. The outcome of this research aims to contribute new 
insights into the contentious debate on refugee management, as the global crisis intensifies. 
 
Literature Review   
The current academic debate on why states appear to prefer restrictive refugee policies has 
been focused disproportionately on the choices and preferences of industrialised Western states 
(Taylor et al., 2016). It is the aim of this research paper to contribute to this gap that has so far 
failed to address in detail the refugee policies of developing countries. Crisp (2003) identified 
that this gap has emerged because most of the regions that have experienced refugee 
management challenges have not been geopolitically salient, and therefore have been 
overlooked. Moreover, though the theoretical and empirical literature on refugee response is 
plentiful, scholars and policymakers alike comment that it is often ‘refugee-centric’ in nature, 
with comparatively little focus on the host governments dealing with large-scale refugee 
populations, and the corresponding effects on host communities (Chambers, 1986, p.247). This 
is in part due to the varying experiences between refugee hosts, which depend on the scale of 
the influxes, the type of conflicts causing them, and the domestic capacities to host refugees, 
which often represents the difference between developed and developing countries (Jacobsen, 
1996). 
There are a number of popular explanations as to why states (both developed and 
developing) have sought restrictive policies in response to refugee management. ‘Restrictive’ 
here refers to both the number of refugees accepted and the nature of the policy i.e. the 
availability of services and levels of freedom afforded to refugee populations. This is 
particularly regrettable to those who support Crisp’s (2003) accusations that the international 
community itself is responsible for setting a dangerous example through its historical 
endeavours to keep refugees contained to their native continents. This behaviour, Crisp reasons, 
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has indirectly led developing countries to emulate similar preferences, to the detriment of 
international humanitarian assistance.   
There are a few factors, often perceived as threats or risks, that governments are 
preoccupied with minimising, and thus shape refugee response policies. The literature has 
revealed that the most pressing policy concerns are the perceived economic and societal impact 
of refugee influxes, and the corresponding threats to national security, underpinned by the 
influence of the political context of the state in question (Jacobsen, 1996). Wright and Moorthy 
(2018) summarize the repressive refugee policies adopted by states as a way to ensure regime 
security, justified by the actual or perceived economic consequences, and the potential for 
dissatisfaction leading to protests against the government. By elaborating further on the 
concerns influencing policy choices and intended outcomes, it becomes clear that states have 
used them to effectively justify policies that reduce the numbers of refugees and their ability to 
integrate into local communities. 
The history of a state’s response to past influxes can prove a strong influence as the 
precedent set often informs new policies (Jacobsen, 1996). The historical responses and 
methods of management contribute to the host community’s perceptions and social 
understanding of refugees (Jacobsen, 1996). Kunz (1981) attributes attitudes, historical 
experience and the perceived permanence of refugee populations to levels of willingness and 
the receptiveness of host communities. This is also affected by the understanding (or lack 
thereof) of the cause of the origins of the influx, the socio-cultural meaning of ‘refugee’, and 
what motivations they might have (i.e. economic or protection). The economic impact and 
cultural differences that refugees are thought to represent can lead a host community to 
‘otherize’ refugees, consequently hindering prospects for successful integration (Wright & 
Moorthy, 2018, p.133).  Particularly in the West, this has affected the definitions of refugees 
and their ability to integrate. Crisp’s (2003) appraisal of the history of refugee management in 
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developing countries shows that developing states have an inconsistent approach. Crisp found 
that the independence struggles across the African continent created numerous refugee 
situations, which encouraged a mutual acceptance of refugees given their shared experiences 
and difficulties. However, the 1980s saw escalating conflict and new forms of exacting 
violence in the post-Cold War era, thus changing the approach of refugee management in the 
face of increasing refugee situations (Crisp, 2003). Additionally, post-independent socio-
economic problems such as unemployment, environmental disasters and HIV pandemics have 
led to host communities resenting the aid focussed on refugee populations (Crisp, 2003). 
The political context within a state is crucial in shaping the policy options available 
(Jacobsen, 1996; Phuong, 2005). Alexander Betts, a prominent scholar on refugee economies, 
explains that the process of creating refugee policy is complicated in Western democracies, 
where policy makers represent opposing sides of the debate on refugee management, which 
often results in a “race to the bottom in terms of political standards” across regional, municipal 
and local authorities (PBS, 2016). This, Betts argues, shows how problematic it can be for 
democracies to produce policies on such divisive matters successfully. Another important 
determinant of the kind of refugee response chosen is often dependent on the incentives at the 
institutional level, which vary greatly (Robinson, 2002). Herbst (2014) found that sub-Saharan 
African countries share the same inherent problems when it comes to consolidating and 
projecting power over their respective territories, both during and after independence. 
However, the overall failure of weak governments to control resources and society, particularly 
in Africa, has had crucial consequences that have led to civil conflict and dysfunctional 
policies, which has increased the number of refugee situations across the continent (Herbst, 
2014). Crisp’s (2003) earlier research confirms the popular opinion that as post-independent 
authoritarian governments evolved into pluralistic systems, refugee responses became 
inconsistent as dictators could accept influxes when it was in their political interest to do so 
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with little opposition. However, as mentioned in the case of western democracies, the way 
policy is formed is very different for the majority of African states.  
There has been little research into the real economic impact of hosting refugees, and 
even less undertaken on the disparities between developed and developing countries (Maystadt 
& Verwimp, 2014; Taylor et al., 2016). This is a puzzling occurrence when one considers that 
the economic capacities of host communities is one of the major concerns that shape the type 
of policies adopted. A number of scholars who have tried to address this gap explain that the 
actual impact of refugees on a host country is difficult to measure in any case, and it is certainly 
problematic to apply learnings or outcomes from one case in a way that can be generalised for 
other cases (Taylor et al, 2016).  
Phuong (2005) alleges that developing countries suffer greater damage to their 
economic prospects due to the struggle to meet humanitarian and domestic needs. This is 
compounded by the fact that historically, international aid rarely satisfies the refugee response 
budget (Miliband & Gurumurthy, 2015). The opinion that refugees are drains on national and 
local economies has endured until today, especially for richer industrialised countries that 
qualify for less international aid. Taylor et al. (2016) explore the origins of this position and 
find that because of the dependent positions refugee populations are confined to, as a result of 
restrictive policies that forbid freedom of movement and employment, refugee management 
has become synonymous with economic strain and long-term financial commitments. There 
are those who accuse governments who proclaim economic reasons for rejecting refugee 
populations, are using the language of economics to hide the real reasons, that of nationalistic 
beliefs and fears for national security (Parsons, 2016).  
In the African context, the most evident barriers to accepting refugees are the risks 
associated with instability of infrastructure in heavily populated areas and the impact on land 
availability. Equally in rural regions, lack of basic infrastructure places a different strain on 
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local communities already struggling. Indeed, Whitaker’s (2002) extensive study on the impact 
of refugees on host communities found that sudden influxes of refugees and aid resources had 
both positive and negative effects on host communities. There are scholars who argue that the 
inevitable environmental impact of a refugee influx, especially in rural regions, leads to social 
unrest due to the increased strains on natural resources (Martin, 2005). There are others who 
claim that refugee populations bring new social and economic opportunities to the area, while 
conceding that on average, employment opportunities will not match the influx of people 
(Whitaker, 2002). This Whitaker (2002) found, ultimately incites frustration and aggression in 
an already emotionally unstable situation. 
Wright & Moorthy’s (2018) research has led them to the conclusion that the presence 
of a refugee population will cause the host state to enact repressive policies even when they are 
from neighbouring countries. Lischer (2005) supports earlier claims that the lack of economic 
opportunity offered to refugees makes protests more likely, hence, the state adopts repressive 
policies to mitigate this risk. This reinforces the popular finding that the lack of opportunities 
keep refugees dependent on the state, which has negative consequences for both refugee 
populations and host communities. Jacobsen (1996) warns that national security encompasses 
more than just militaristic notions of threats. This is an extension of Ullman’s (1983) 
theorisation that threats to environmental and socio-economic stability also pose risks to a 
national government’s ability to control both the population and its availability of policy 
choices. Indeed, scholars agree that restricting refugees to camps is the preferred option of 
states as it affords governments the ability to monitor and control the population, and keep it 
separate from host communities, due to the fear of ethnic divisions and economic disturbances 
(Jacobsen, 1996).  
State concerns of this nature are easily presented as a significant risk to the population 
and the overall stability of the state, reinforcing the sovereign right to make decisions to protect 
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national security interests over providing protection to vast numbers of refugees (Murillo, 
2009). Murillo links the September 11 terrorist attack in 2001 to the rise in national security 
concerns surrounding terrorism, which has threatened to undermine international refugee 
protection (Murillo, 2009). The threat of terrorism in the West is perceived as inherently 
foreign in its origins, thus creating irrational fears of ‘foreign’ people fleeing their own 
domestic terrorism (Jacobson, 2003). Murillo (2009) claims this misunderstanding feeds into 
negative perceptions of refugees as unfamiliar groups of people who threaten cultural identities 
and ways of life. Crisp (2003) reminds us that in both industrialised and developing states, 
populations are mobilised through the state’s promotion of nationalistic and sometimes 
xenophobic rhetoric, often through placing responsibility for a society’s problems on refugee 
populations. Messages of this kind are particularly compelling in poorer societies in developing 
countries. 
 
Theoretical expectations 
The explanations uncovered in the the current literature can be translated into four 
theoretical expectations that represent the most salient concerns of states in creating refugee 
management policy, which to date have been used to create restrictive refugee policies. To 
explore the unique case of Uganda, and to identify where Uganda diverges from the norm, the 
following expectations can be explored to find which one or ones can account for Uganda’s 
response: 
 
 E 1: The history of a state’s past response and the host communities’ social 
receptiveness to refugees will influence how integrative the policy will be.  
 
 E 2: The specific political context of the state will influence refugee policy creation. 
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 E 3: The perceived economic impact on the capacity of the host community justifies 
restrictive policies. 
 
 E 4: Perceived threats to national security influence states to adopt obstructive policies 
to limit the numbers and integration prospects of refugees.  
 
Research Design  
The Uganda Case 
Despite such obstructive attitudes dominating the international discourse, there are 
some cases where a different attitude prevails. By investigating the factors behind the world’s 
most progressive refugee policies, it can invite valuable new insights into global refugee 
management. The case of Uganda offers a unique approach to integrating refugees into society 
and providing long-term alternatives, increased development and mutual benefits for host and 
refugee communities (Betts et al., 2014). This is despite the fact that Uganda is one of the 
poorest countries in the world, with basic services and infrastructure, questionable democratic 
credentials and a history of corruption and violence (Wawa, 2008). Moreover, Uganda has a 
long domestic history of enforced displacement, most recently from the terror unleashed by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army in the north of the country. Uganda’s exceptional policies have 
evolved since the late 1990s to become concerned with finding permanent solutions for 
unlimited numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries to spend the coming years in 
Uganda peacefully, contributing to society and the economy, and benefiting from equal access 
to public services.  
Due to the growing number of protracted conflicts in Africa and Asia in the 1990s, 
international agencies and humanitarian donors have been prompted to refocus refugee 
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strategies to a more long-term model, finding that the “care and maintenance” programmes of 
camps were indeed wasting limited funds and offering entirely inadequate assistance (Kaiser, 
2006, p.352). Offering a sustainable approach to refugee management, the concept of Refugee 
Aid and Development (RAD) was realised by the UNHCR as a promising opportunity to 
redefine refugee management in the 21st century. One of the earliest manifestations of this is 
the UNHCR’s pilot programme in cooperation with the Ugandan government, which employed 
a ‘Self-Reliance Strategy’ (SRS), initiated in 1999. The strategy was founded on two major 
principles that sought to empower refugees and host communities to be able to support 
themselves, and to develop the capacity to integrate refugee populations into society through 
offering equal access to services (Malik, 2003).  
The strategy has since been updated to the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment 
(ReHOPE) strategic framework in 2016 that compliments national legislation on refugee 
management. The UNHCR and World Bank have funded this project that integrates the 
development needs of the community with the needs of the refugees as part of a growing global 
recognition that, as conflicts last longer, refugees and hosts can mutually benefit from such 
protracted situations (Betts et al, 2014). It encourages refugees to become ‘self-reliant’ through 
equal employment, health and education opportunities, in addition to each family receiving a 
plot of land and the necessities to rebuild their lives. By enabling refugees to work, the goal is 
to enable families to become less reliant on aid, integrate into the local community and boost 
local economies. Uganda has accepted exceptional numbers of people regardless of origin, 
even giving persons from South Sudan prima facie asylum (The World Bank, 2016). 
The most recent example of Uganda’s progressive policies under investigation in this 
research project are concentrated on the response to the recent influx of refugees fleeing South 
Sudan since the summer of 2016. Uganda has accepted and processed more than one million 
refugees from the conflict at its northern border (UNHCR, 2018). All refugees fleeing civil war 
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have the option to reside in refugee settlements (where international agencies are operating), 
or they are free to seek employment and residence anywhere in Uganda. The Ugandan ethos of 
acceptance is visible in the absence of a single refugee camp, preferring to place the emphasis 
on the long-term alternatives of the eighteen ‘settlement areas’. 
Despite the predictable strains resulting from poor funding, basic infrastructure and the 
sheer number of refugees, the policies so far have achieved incredible success in integrating 
and encouraging self-reliance in other long-term settlements in the west of the country. In 2014, 
Betts et al. conducted research in two older settlements in the West of Uganda, where they 
found that 60% of refugees were self-employed, 39% were employed by others, and only 1% 
was fully dependent on humanitarian aid (Betts et al, 2014). Such a relaxed border policy 
contradicts policies implemented elsewhere even within Africa, (despite Uganda facing 
comparable security fears and intense strain on funding and infrastructure in the north). 
 
Methodology 
The aim of the research project is to identify the factors that have influenced Uganda’s decision 
to implement refugee management policies that differ from the approaches favoured by most 
other states. To find the most complete explanations to the research question, the strategy is to 
establish (from the literature) the most salient theoretical explanations for why states choose 
not to accept and integrate influxes of refugees. Such explanations have been drawn from the 
current academic literature explored above and are formalised as ‘expectations’ that will guide 
the following qualitative case study of Uganda. The four expectations can be operationalised 
to represent four key significant factors, which can be tested to reveal its influence on Uganda’s 
policy choices. The four key areas of influence that can be applied to the Uganda case are:  
 The history of response and social receptiveness, 
 Political context 
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 Economic impact on the host community 
 National security fears 
This will welcome an investigation through a system of process tracing to identify which of 
the main factors or ‘causal dynamics’ have driven Uganda’s unique policies, by essentially 
asking the question: ‘‘Was X a cause of Y in case Z?’’ (Mahoney, 2012, p.571). Where case Z 
is Uganda, Y is the national refugee policy, and X is each of the four main factors found in the 
literature review.  
Given the lack of research on the responses and capacities of developing countries, a 
preliminary ‘causal process observation’ approach is justified, in order to find the explanatory 
factors for Uganda (Beach, 2017). This approach investigates the causal dynamics within the 
context inherent to the case which have contributed to the particular outcome. Falleti and Lynch 
refer to the contextual conditions as the “relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, 
spatial, or institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads … to an outcome” (2009, 
p.1160). This approach requires an in-depth understanding of Uganda, in order to find the 
sources of its uniqueness. By defining expectations drawn from the current academic debate, 
explanations can be interpreted from the Uganda case, to offer tentative explanations to the 
research question. The investigation will explore the structures, histories and relationships in 
the Ugandan context to identify where and how Uganda diverges from the norm. The outcome 
of the research will offer interpretations of the available evidence about the context and 
conditions behind the policies, that could be significant for similar cases in future research. By 
doing this, potential shortcomings in the current theories might be illuminated, which would 
invite further research and perhaps revision of certain theories. It will also seek to illuminate 
other factors not yet identified to deepen the explanations for Uganda’s exceptionalism, and 
contribute new considerations that influence refugee policy.  
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In order to conduct the research, information gathering from a wide variety of sources 
that will inform diverse explanations is necessary. First-hand research is impossible to conduct 
in this case, meaning that the research is mostly secondary, though some primary data can be 
obtained through transcripts of interviews and speeches. Efforts will be made to triangulate this 
primary data with secondary sources derived from academic, historical and public documents 
to establish the historical and contextual explanations for Uganda’s policies. Information 
published by both national and local Ugandan news media in conjunction with international 
press will offer another opportunity to gather first-hand information and accounts. The official 
documents and reports from the Ugandan government, the UNHCR and the Worldbank are 
also valuable sources of reliable information when combined. Academic literature and 
anthropological studies on Uganda will also provide historical perspectives on Ugandan 
politics, people and history. The use of this secondary data can prove invaluable for providing 
context in the absence of primary data that cannot be obtained in this case. 
The following sections explore how these four factors, derived from the expectations, 
have influenced Uganda’s policies by interpreting the available information. Each of these 
sections will investigate the available evidence to either support or refute the predictions 
offered by the expectations in the case of Uganda. The investigation will conclude with a 
discussion that adjudicates between the proposed explanations to articulate which are the most 
compelling explanations in the Uganda context, and a discussion on the strengths and 
limitations of this approach.  
 
Investigation of the Ugandan case 
History and social receptiveness 
The simple fact of geography renders Uganda a likely destination for refugees to seek sanctuary 
in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. Uganda is landlocked in the middle of a region that 
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has seen violent conflict, ethnic and religious persecution, political instability and 
environmental disasters (Kanyangara, 2016). For this reason, Uganda is often the most logical 
and immediate place of refuge for people in neighbouring countries. Uganda has offered 
considerable political and economic stability, compared to its neighbours, since the mid-1980s 
when current president Yoweri Museveni assumed power in a military coup. The Great Lakes’ 
violent shared history has ensured that much of the population within the region has 
experienced life as refugees themselves and accepted neighbours for hundreds of years 
(Kanyangara, 2016). Uganda itself is “a country of refugees and exiles” says Ugandan historian 
and journalist, Charles Onyango-Obbo (2017).  
In fact, Uganda’s most recent civil conflict with Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) destroyed the Northern territory of the country and created thousands of refugees. This 
same region is where the current influx from South Sudan are currently sheltered and might 
contribute to a stronger sense of understanding the meaning of what it is the be a refugee. 
Several journalists working in the region have captured this mutual understanding when a local 
living in the Bidi Bidi settlement area explained, “People here are very hospitable because at 
one time we were refugees in South Sudan. They hosted us until there was peace in Uganda” 
(Byaruhanga, 2017). Another refugee from South Sudan revealed, “I call Uganda my second 
home” (Rwakaringi, 2017).   
The Great Lakes region in East Africa was once a mass of land, lakes and rural 
communities until the 20th century when it was divided between British, French and German 
colonists. The countries of Burundi, Tanzania, Sudan, Kenya and Rwanda shared tribal, 
religious and ethnic identities with Uganda, and a strong sense of community remains within 
the region (Kanyangara, 2016), which is most tangibly demonstrated by the economic union of 
the East African Community. In a speech at a fundraising event held in Kampala in June 2017, 
entitled the Refugee Solidarity Summit, President Museveni summarises the interlinked 
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histories and identities by referring to East Africans as: “We the indigenous people of the Great 
Lakes Region” (State House, 2017). Museveni makes frequent reference to the fragmentation 
of the entire region by colonial rule, which without those arbitrary lines, might still resemble 
one region of a diverse population. The Great Lakes region has been undergoing a project of 
integration since the beginning of the 20th century, creating an East African Community with 
a customs union, free trade area and freedom of movement. In fact the ultimate goal of the 
EAC is political integration to form a “super-state under a single political 
authority/government” (East African Community, 2017). This wish for a united region 
stemming from the political level might influence states to protect and integrate their 
neighbours to both encourage a sense of belonging and start to weaken borders dividing 
nations.  
 In the same speech referenced above, Museveni describes the long tradition of East 
Africans traversing the Great Lakes region, either fleeing tyrannical kingdoms, environmental 
issues, or seeking employment. The region was characterised as having freedom of movement, 
protection in new kingdoms, and the right to return home. This tradition stemmed from the 
shared experience of violence and enforced migration, and the recognition of the mutual 
benefits of sharing the new skills or capital brought by refugees (State House, 2017). He 
explained to his international audience that “This was the concept of managing refugees before 
the onset of colonialism” (State House, 2017). He attributes this to their ‘dynamic’ concept as 
opposed to the ‘static’ perception of refugees that international law favours. 
Museveni has mentioned in a number of speeches, both to international and African 
audiences and interviewers, that of the four main linguistic families on the African continent, 
the Great Lakes region is home to both Niger-Congo (Bantu) and Nilo-Saharan groups, which 
has helped local Ugandan communities to “absorb or co-exist” with refugees (State House, 
2017). Naturally, such groups encompass hundreds of dialects, but does reflect the shared 
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history and tribal interconnectedness of the region and may reflect shared linguistic trends 
between Northern Ugandan and South Sudanese regions specifically. This statement on shared 
linguistic identity is reinforced by repeatedly referencing the “pan-Africanist ideological 
orientation” of Uganda, which is the idea that Uganda is part of a wider interconnected region, 
which shouldn’t rely on tribal divisions, rather recognising their shared identities and interests 
(State House, 2017). In light of this, Uganda is clearly offering asylum to refugees who are 
more than just geographical neighbours.  
Museveni regularly extolls his pan-African ideology, speaking of protecting the 
interests of the African people at large which include development, wealth creation, market 
access, education and health (State House, 2017). Museveni is a vocal advocator for accepting 
refugees and capitalising on the skills they bring. Unsurprisingly, his openness towards hosting 
refugees might stem from his own experience as a youth forced to seek exile in Tanzania 
(Official Website of Yoweri Museveni, 2016). In the following section, the importance of the 
personal experience of the president becomes evident as an investigation of Uganda’s domestic 
politics deepens our understanding of Uganda and its policy choices.  
Political context 
The academic debate reviewed in the previous sections produced the ‘political context’ as an 
influential factor and an important determinant in the types of policies implemented. 
Investigating Uganda’s political climate and the key decision-makers involved in national 
policy offers an interesting uniqueness. In the case of Uganda, the most logical first line of 
enquiry is the president Yoweri Museveni himself. Museveni, considered a “presidential 
monarch” by many, has presided over the Ugandan government for the last thirty-two years in 
what is deemed an increasingly undemocratic government (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). 
Uganda’s aforementioned political stability is owed in part, to the ‘no-party’ system 
implemented in the 1990’s, which claimed to eradicate the damaging effects of tribal and 
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religious divisions that had previously fuelled conflict (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). A political 
system such as this allowed for a greatly reduced opposition, which has endured until today 
despite introducing a multi-party system in 2005. Moreover, the ruling National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) party is considered to be exceptionally weak, with little organisation or 
opportunities to act independently (Izama & Wilkerson, 2011). 
Museveni is conspicuously the single person who makes the crucial decisions of 
government, makes appointments and dismissals and controls the disbursement of public 
resources (Wilkins & Vokes, 2017). His control has been demonstrated through his interference 
in the military, parliament, and even the Supreme Court (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). This is 
significant when we consider that all refugee management policies are conducted through the 
Department of Refugees in the Office of the Prime Minister, located in the State House, directly 
under the supervision of the “over-bearing” president (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). Betts explains 
that Uganda differs from other democratic states as the decision to adopt integrative refugee 
policy concerns a very small number of people, who are fiercely loyal to the president and the 
ruling NRM party (PBS, 2017).  
Uganda’s policies have been possible to create because there are lower standards of 
accountability, as Museveni is a president with little opposition. This is compounded by the 
fact that, (according to Uganda’s opposition members), much of Museveni’s close ministers, 
military commanders and supreme judges, owe their careers, and therefore their fortunes, to 
the president (Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). Such patronage politics have enabled Museveni to 
achieve his political goals relatively unhindered. Such goals include amending the constitution 
by removing age limits on presidential eligibility, thereby extending his eligibility for a sixth 
term in the 2021 elections. Interestingly, the amendment included an extension to 
parliamentary membership from five to seven years (News24, 2017). This has raised more 
questions about the democratic credentials of Uganda’s domestic politics. A survey of public 
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opinion conducted by two independent Ugandan civil rights bodies found 85% of Ugandans 
did not support the notion of Museveni fulfilling a lifetime presidency (Goitom, 2017).  
Another reason for Museveni’s waning domestic support is that after thirty-two years 
in power, Uganda has seen very little development, economic or democratic progress, despite 
these goals being promised as a ten-point programme in the late 1980s. The northern region, 
currently hosting the refugee influx from South Sudan, has suffered the most in recent years. 
Civil war wrought by Joseph Kony destroyed the region and displaced more than two million 
people, leaving much of the region with recent memories of being forced to seek protection 
elsewhere (Bavier, 2009). The marginalisation of the Northern peoples continued after the 
conflict, leaving the region disproportionately underrepresented in government as Museveni 
has consistently appointed cabinet ministers and officials from the South and Central regions 
(Perkins, 2008). This reality has historically affected support for Museveni and the NRM, 
reflected in poor voting patterns in the north (Juma, 2011). As will be explored in the following 
section, the current focus of service delivery and infrastructure (by both international agencies 
and the government) in the region is improving the host community’s quality of life, and 
perhaps influencing new support for Museveni in the North.  
Economic capacity 
Most states justify restrictive policies by claiming the economic demands and strains on 
infrastructure are too great. Uganda’s policies however, appear to use their limited capacities 
to their advantage. The economic incentive for a developing country such as Uganda is 
underpinned by its openness to refugees; Betts claims, “Uganda’s historical advocates for 
refugee rights have been “progressive” not just because of their support for refugees but also 
as a means to access and allocate resources towards their refugee hosting constituencies” (The 
Conversation, 2017). Uganda has developed its policies from 2001 to present in conjunction 
with various joint-strategies and national programmes to make refugee management and 
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national development mutual beneficiaries. In the wake of the most recent influx of refugees 
from South Sudan, host communities in the north of Uganda are experiencing improved service 
delivery and new infrastructure as a result of refugee assistance policies and international 
funding.  
The first national refugee policy introduced in 2006 focused on the rights of refugees, 
freedom of movement and the initiation of a ‘development-based approach’ to refugee 
management (Refugee Regulations, 2006). This was driven by the results of the Self-Reliance 
pilot programme and at its conclusion, the Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) 
strategy was implemented to “address some of the problems of poverty and under-development 
in refugee hosting districts which could promote further peace, security and stability in the 
region” (Malik, 2003, p.6). This called for further UNHCR assistance to fund burden-sharing 
between host communities and government, and to improve the quality of life for both refugees 
and host communities. The 2010 Refugee Regulations Act furthered this through Art. 61 
‘Integration of refugee matters in development plans’, which incoporated refugee maintenance 
into Uganda’s national development plan for the years 2015 to 2020 through integrating the 
SRS framework. By absorbing the SRS strategy, Uganda has been able to combine refugee 
management and national development projects; a shrewd move given the government’s poor 
delivery of development projects and the large scale of refugees entering the country. 
By 2016, the ReHOPE strategy by the UNHCR and Worldbank introduced the 
recommendation that 30% of all humanitarian response programmes and expenses should be 
spent in the interest of local host communities, and local Ugandans be employed by 
international NGOs conducting work in the field (UNHCR, 2016). In last two years since the 
crisis, the Northern Acholi region on South Sudan’s border has seen large-scale projects to 
improve infrastructure, such as building borehole water points, new roads, schools and 
hospitals, not to mention creating local energy provision thanks to Uganda’s policies 
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(WorldBank, 2016). The new infrastructure and services implemented in the refugee region to 
the North is providing the services the NRM has not to date.  
In light of this, Museveni’s 1996 campaign pledge to orchestrate mass liberalisation of 
various policies and the privatisation of major public services could be interpreted as a move 
to reduce the pressure on his government to deliver the promised development and 
infrastructural projects across the country. He has been transparent on this, claiming, “we 
would like the burden of funding infrastructure development to be borne partially by private 
funding so that the state does not have to borrow too much from abroad” (Museveni, 1996, p. 
39). However, by 2003 Uganda’s entire development budget was financed by international aid, 
not to mention half of all public expenditure came from international donors (Tangri & 
Mwenda, 2010). We can interpret from this that Museveni and the NRM are finally achieving 
their goal of unburdening the government from the responsibility to deliver public services. 
National security threats 
The outcome of the literature review produced the expectation that states favour 
restrictive refugee policies that reduce the number of people entering their territory and limit 
integration with host communities, for fear of risking national security.  Uganda in this respect 
appears not to subscribe to this line of thought. National policies and frameworks to date have 
not mentioned concrete plans to anticipate or react to threats to national security, although there 
is a heavier national army presence along South Sudan’s border.  
The chaos wrought for three decades by the LRA in the north is still fresh in Uganda’s 
collective memory, and the official termination of the search for Kony and his closest allies 
just one year ago, despite beliefs they are still in hiding, has terrified communities in the north 
(Burke & Mwesigwa, 2017). We could interpret the international presence in the northern 
settlements as beneficial for national security. It might offer some form of indirect protection 
from Kony’s forces, as LRA militants might be less likely to target areas near the border with 
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such international presence, particularly because the International Criminal Court still has 
arrest warrants out for at least four LRA leaders with one (Dominic Ongwen) currently standing 
trial (ICC, 2005).  
Uganda would appear to diverge even from its African neighbours regarding fears about 
the potential for militants or terrorists to cross national borders seeking ‘sanctuary’. In East 
Africa, the fear that camps and settlements provide fertile ground on which to recruit or 
radicalise individuals, is a recognised concern which almost saw Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma 
camps shut down in 2017 (World Vision, 2016).  However, Uganda’s policy of welcoming all 
who enter has never wavered. Uganda has certainly invested in its image as an equal partner in 
the global war on terror and US’s most important partner in Africa, thus gaining a strong status 
in both the region and abroad, which has earnt it favourable military training and resources 
(Fisher, 2012). However, this belies the fact that Ugandan forces have been controversially 
involved in South Sudan’s conflict from 2013 to 2015 (The East African Monitor, 2015). 
Uganda’s early involvement in South Sudan’s conflict has caused the UN to accuse it of 
escalating the violence, even though troops withdrew in 2015 (The East Africa Monitor, 2018).  
 
Discussion 
Findings 
 E 1: The history of a state’s past response and the host communities’ social 
receptiveness to refugees will influence how integrative the policy will be.  
After interpreting the historical factors that might influence Uganda’s policies, it is clear that 
the diverse Great Lakes region, with its strong history of movement and interconnectedness, 
appears to offer a fertile ground on which to implement liberal policies that welcome refugees 
from neighbouring states. That migration has happened for hundreds of years prior to the border 
construction of colonial times, has encouraged liberal socio-cultural attitudes towards refugees. 
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The strong sense of a shared history and mutual experiences of life as refugees, not to mention 
language similarities and ancestries pre-dating the colonial era, suggest that integrating 
neighbours into Ugandan society is a much simpler task than for Western societies. In light of 
this, initial assumptions reveal that in Uganda, providing for one’s neighbours is to uphold 
historical and political traditions, not to mention contributes to maintaining stability in a fragile 
region. 
Uganda thoroughly satisfies the first expectation that the history of state responses and 
the level of social receptiveness in host communities will influence how integrative refugee 
policies are, and proves that similarities between host communities and refugees is a genuine 
influence. Consequently, this finding also confirms the inverse, that Western states may restrict 
refugees from different cultural origins because peaceful integration is less likely. 
 
 E 2: The specific political context of the state will influence refugee policy creation. 
The domestic political situation in Uganda has enabled its liberal and generous refugee policies 
to be enacted, thus confirming the expectation provided by the current debate. The significant 
position president Museveni holds in government allows him to make key decisions with 
guaranteed support from his party, and limited avenues for opposition party members to 
obstruct them. Much of his support is owed to the fact that though he is a strong leader, his 
NRM party is weak, not to mention that high-ranking officials risk their jobs and livelihoods if 
they oppose him. If a new president was elected, or indeed took control, the likelihood that 
Uganda’s political, judicial and military elite would be investigated for crimes such as fraud, 
corruption, incitement of violence (to name a few) is great. Museveni’s ambitions to hold a 
lifetime presidency cannot be confirmed as fact, however, his recent actions to remove age 
limits on his eligibility are strong evidence. 
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Museveni has been accused of increasingly autocratic behaviour in the last decade, 
including election fraud and state-sponsored violence. There is a growing opinion that 
Museveni is “a dictator with nothing left to promise Uganda” (Akumu, 2014). In light of this, 
his refugee policies are attracting international recognition that could be a useful strategy to 
deflect attention from his shortcomings and ambitions for a lifetime presidency. As he 
continues to campaign for weakening national divides and diluting ethnic identities, he is 
simultaneously encouraging a more regional support base, and strengthening his position as a 
progressive leader on a continent suffering from questionable leaderships.  
Much of Uganda’s refugee policy is informed by Museveni’s personal experience as a 
refugee, and his ambitions to spread a new ‘pan-African’ ideology that dilutes borders and 
tribal identities. In light of this, perhaps explanations of influential factors on refugee policy 
should be widened to encompass the ideologies of the governments and personalities 
responsible for making refugee responses. The case of Uganda would reflect Crisp’s (2003) 
claim that many African leaders have historically accepted refugees when it has served their 
political interests.  
His other ambition to oversee the creation of an “East African Federation”, has also 
invited suspicions about his desire to become its first leader (Warungu, 2011). Museveni has 
proclaimed his ambitions for deeper integration of the region since the 1996 election campaign, 
and to, “Work towards ending the balkanisation of Africa” (Museveni, 1996, p.13). Those 
ambitions have endured, as evidenced when he claimed; “together with our partners we want 
East Africa to become one country” (Al Jazeera, 2017). We can interpret Uganda’s policy of 
accepting refugees from all neighbours in the region, integrating them, investing in their health 
and education, not to mention encouraging employment, as a step in the direction of breaking 
down national barriers, and solidifying Museveni’s position as the most capable and 
progressive pioneer fit to lead a united East Africa.  
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The findings within the political context of Uganda do confirm that this factor can 
influence the refugee policies depending on the style of leader and inherent political structures. 
In the African context, the theories offered by Betts and Crisp regarding the relative ease with 
which more authoritarian governments can pass otherwise contentious legislation, and that 
African leaders often accept refugees to serve political agendas are confirmed in the Uganda 
case.  
 
 E 3: The perceived economic impact on the capacity of the host community 
justifies restrictive policies. 
Uganda’s policies show quite unequivocally that this expectation is unfounded in this 
case, where the progressive policies are clearly a beneficial strategy for national development. 
The generous acceptance of refugees has allowed Uganda to accumulate international 
assistance beyond that of simple material aid. International funds directed at service delivery 
and building new infrastructure that benefit host communities too, have created renewed 
markets and new employment in the northern territory of Uganda. Beyond this commendable 
and progressive policy, it can be argued that such benefits to the north of the country will be 
useful for a president seeking to stay in power, or improve a legacy that has until now been 
marred by poor development in the country’s poorest region. This is strategic for more than the 
obvious improvements to development and financial assistance, by capitalising on the 
hospitable culture of the locals and finally bringing opportunities, infrastructure and emerging 
markets, Museveni might have turned public support for him in the region around, if indeed he 
seeks a seventh term in office to secure a life presidency.  
Indeed, the preferred policy of containing refugee influxes to camps ensures that refugee 
populations will be perpetually reliant on aid. This is a strong argument for not accepting 
refugees in the first place. Uganda’s different approach calls into question the premise of this 
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expectation that so deftly describes the popular response of governments. Especially for 
developing economies, Uganda shows that refugee policies and populations can be hugely 
beneficial. This offers an interesting avenue for further research on the future of refugee 
management. This is of particular importance for developing countries, not least because they 
host the worlds majority of refugees and might also benefit from increased infrastructure and 
service capacity. 
 
 E 4: Perceived threats to national security influence states to adopt obstructive 
policies to limit the numbers and integration prospects of refugees.  
Uganda’s refugee policy clearly contravenes the argument that concerns for national security, 
so salient in the West, always influence repressive and isolationist policies. Instead, the policies 
appear to favour ensuring human security surrounding the settlement areas, over national 
security. The integrative nature of the strategies ensures mitigated conflict by providing both 
the host community and refugees with what they need. By respecting the skills and freedoms 
of refugees and offering shared access to services and infrastructure for entire settlement areas, 
the policy seeks to both ease the plight of refugees, by allowing them to be independent from 
aid, and pacify host communities. This should reduce the potential grievances that might 
otherwise cause host or refugee communities to protest or indeed clash with each other.  
Moreover, issues of national security in other regions, particularly in the West, centre 
on the ‘foreign’ origins of refugee populations, which encompass racial and religious 
differences. In Uganda, as aforementioned, such arguments are less significant in a region as 
interconnected as the Great Lakes in terms of language and the shared experience of being 
refugees themselves. However, as resources and funds continue to decrease, social insecurity 
and discontent is becoming more likely. 
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There is little available evidence to suggest that issues of national security have 
influenced Uganda’s refugee policy. This is a fundamental divergence with much of the 
popular debate surrounding refugee policy. It could be interpreted that the economic and 
political benefits far outweigh the risk to national security, or it might suggest that a developing 
country such as our case, lacks the ability or capacity to enforce national security measures in 
response to refugee influxes or any other perceived threat.  
 
A Fifth Explanation 
Building on the suggestion that ideologies and individuals be considered in refugee policy 
decisions, another explanation could be drawn from Uganda’s case. There is strong evidence 
investigated in this paper to suggest that president Museveni is the central figure behind 
Uganda’s refugee policies. Beyond using policies as a strategy to manage his international 
image and deflect attention from his domestic activities, they could also be used to serve a 
regional agenda that seeks to enhance his position as the evident regional stabiliser with liberal 
values. Undeniably, the links between advocating for a pan-African ideology, accepting and 
integrating scores of citizens from the Great Lakes region and seeking to create a single East 
African state are compelling. We can also interpret offering long-term residency, unrestricted 
opportunities to participate in the Ugandan economy and attend university as a step in the 
direction of breaking down the borders currently separating peoples in the East African region.  
If Museveni is to achieve a life presidency then the international support of world 
leaders and organisations will be important, for a reliable image on an international scale might 
reduce the likelihood of an international backlash or pressure to resign, particularly in response 
to his more controversial domestic activities. The current refugee situation presents a 
precarious position for the international community: if Museveni were indeed able to secure an 
extended tenure, there might be significant protests, and Uganda’s Western supporters would 
be expected to apply the necessary pressure on him to resign. However, regime change in a 
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notoriously unstable region, amid the refugee crisis in the north, might risk the smooth 
provision of services and the destabilization of the region.  
The altruistic and generous image Uganda is currently enjoying in the eyes of the 
international community is also enhancing its position as the regional stabiliser in East Africa. 
Museveni appears to relish his status as “the most powerful and significant pro-Western leader 
in the region remaining” (Okwir, 2012). The policies do not only contribute to the favourable 
views of Uganda and Museveni, but also strengthen his case for a united region that he is the 
most capable of leading.  Viewing Uganda’s refugee policies in light of president Museveni’s 
political interests, we are prompted to view them as a useful bargaining tool for Museveni, for 
greater financial assistance, for elevating his position both in the region and internationally, 
and for securing his place as Ugandan president in the years to come. 
Alternative explanations could infer from the Uganda case that authoritative regimes 
are more likely to be able to manage crises by implementing policies that reflect the political 
will of a select group, who are free of the accountability obstacles inherent in liberal 
democracies. There is also significant evidence to warrant further investigation into the 
influence of prominent personalities and leadership styles on refugee policies, for though 
authoritarian governments might indeed implement policies more effectively in response to 
crises for example, it does not mean that this will be the preference of all states with 
authoritative rulers. Thus, this alternative answer is still underpinned by the new finding of this 
research paper, that key figures within the political context might have considerable influence 
on the types of policies made.  
A final alternative explanation might argue that Uganda has been able to implement 
progressive refugee policies because it has received more funds and strategic assistance by 
international agencies such as the UNHCR, than other countries. However, as this investigation 
has established, it is the historical context of Uganda and society’s understanding of what it 
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means to be a refugee, that has allowed such progressive policies to be implemented and 
indeed, successful.  
 
Conclusion 
This research paper has identified that the most influential factors behind Uganda’s liberal and 
progressive refugee policies are the socio-cultural understandings of refugees resulting from 
the shared history of the region, the improved services and infrastructure implemented by 
international bodies, and the political incentives for its ruling elite. It has shown that in the case 
of Uganda, the humanitarian challenge has been transformed into a development opportunity 
(Betts, 2014).  It also shows that by recognising the plight of refugees and their situations, 
offering them protection and respecting their potential to contribute to the local and national 
economy, refugee policy can be a tool for mutual benefit. The research conducted has not been 
sufficiently able to interpret concerns for national security as a strong influential factor, though 
this may be due to its sensitive nature, which might affect the amount of information available. 
The outcome of this research paper has contributed another valid explanation inherent to the 
Uganda case that interprets president Museveni’s designs for a potential lifetime presidency, 
or indeed securing regional hegemony by leading an East African Federation, as influential 
factors driving Uganda’s liberal refugee policies. This new finding might invite further research 
and consideration of the influence that political ambitions and personalities of heads of states 
have in relation to refugee responses. This would have particular relevance for developing 
countries with semi-democratic or indeed authoritarian systems of government.  
Investigating the solutions to mass influxes in host countries, and the benefits it can 
offer, can contribute to changing harmful perceptions of refugees and their effects on host 
communities. If Uganda’s policies withstand the current pressure of South Sudan’s exodus into 
its northern territory, then its example could help to begin deconstructing the popular 
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arguments against accepting and integrating refugees, and advocate for policy change on a 
global scale. Learning from the case of Uganda might reveal lessons for future progressive 
refugee policies on how refugee management can be a particular benefit to developing 
countries. Whether or not Uganda’s policies will be able to withhold growing pressures and 
underfunding, the fact remains that Uganda is a shining example of how a state can offer refuge 
to neighbours in need without question, by respecting rights, accepting the skills they have to 
offer, and investing in their future. However, the results of this investigation finds that 
Uganda’s policies are driven in large part by the machinations of its less than altruistic 
president, leaving us questioning whether Uganda really can be considered the ‘poster child’ 
of refugee policy. 
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